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INTRODUCTION

The protection of intellectual property rights, and more particularly the patent rights claimed by the pharmaceutical industry, surfaced as an issue of international contention between
developed and developing countries following the World Trade
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Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in Uruguay in 1994.1 At
the heart of the disagreement is the growing global awareness
pertaining to the epidemic levels of HIV, AIDS, and other treatable, if not yet curable, diseases plaguing the developing world.2
The November 2001 Ministerial Meeting in Qatar met in the
shadow of the failure of the Seattle WTO meeting, where no agreement as to the next round of trade liberalization talks was reached
in part because of disagreements between the developing and
developed States2 Also looming over the Qatar meetings was the
new geopolitical reality born after the September 11th terrorist
attacks on the United States and the bio-terrorism that followed.4
On November 14, 2001, a resolution from Qatar emerged, directly
addressing the issue of pharmaceutical intellectual property
rights protection during a time of growing popular concern for
both well-established and emerging public health threats.5
1. See David Dollar and Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 120, for a recent comprehensive discussion on the debate about
globalization and trade and its effect on the developing world. This piece reflects the
dissatisfaction and concern expressed by leaders from the developing world with
regards to the pace of implementation for concessions made by their counterparts in
the developed nations, pertaining to farming subsidies and other forms of trade
protection that remain in place for the benefit of domestic industries. Many in the
developing world question the fairness of the developed nations' actions (or lack
thereof) in light of the pressure the developing countries are under to implement and
enforce the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round, which resulted in the
creation of the WTO. One of many such concessions made by the developing countries
of the world is the implementation of intellectual property rights. The article argues
that a growing protectionist movement in the rich countries is a dangerous
phenomenon that threatens efforts to bring down trade barriers and the future
welfare of the developing world's citizenry.
2. For a recent and comprehensive discussion on HIV/AIDS and other diseases
that ravage people across the world, see Challengesfor Humanity: War on Disease and
Amid the Unrelenting Spread of AIDS: Search for a Cure, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
MAGAZiNE 2 & 32 (Vol. 201, No. 2, Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Challenges for Humanity].
3. Push Comes to Shove, THE EcoNoMisT, November 9, 2001, availableat http://
www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StoryID=852371 (last visited Apr.
23, 2002). The article describes the WTO's gathering in Seattle in December 1999, as
an "embarrassing failure, with acrimony between delegates and massive antiglobalization protests on the streets." The article goes on to describe how "the deep
divisions between the poor and rich countries [again] threatened the possibility of a
new trade round in the months leading to the Doha, Qatar meeting in November
2001."
4. Elizabeth Olson, Drug Issue Casts a Shadow on Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
2 2001, at W1.
5. For the full text of the Doha, Qatar Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health see Appendix A. See also World Trade Organization, Doha, Qatar
Declaration, at http://www.wto.orgenglish/thewto_e/minist -e/min01_e/min0le.htm.
(last visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health].
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The Qatar resolution gives States tremendous latitude in
addressing domestic health threats by legitimating the practice of
developing States of invoking the WTO's Agreement on Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in times of public
health crises for the purpose of obtaining needed pharmaceutical
products.' The resolution's inclusion of a provision for the granting of compulsory licenses to produce generic drugs,7 of a provision
granting members the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency s and a provision to delay implementation of
intellectual property protection laws in the "least-developed"
countries (LDCs)9 is seemingly a victory for the developing world
and its sick. Nevertheless, the question still remains whether the
resolution's expansion of a State's right to invoke a "national
emergency" at times of "urgency" relating to public health may
ultimately serve as a chilling disincentive for the research and
development of new drugs in the developed countries, which in the
long term has the potential of indiscriminately disadvantaging all
the peoples of the world.
This comment will examine the balance that the WTO's
TRIPS Agreement attempts to strike between the long-term need
for pharmaceutical research and development and the short-term
need for access to affordable medicines particularly in the developing world. In particular, section II of the comment will explore the
development of the World Trade Organization and the TRIPS
Agreement as one of the legal texts comprising the overall agreement to form the WTO. Section III will explore the philosophical
underpinnings to the TRIPS Agreement and its search for the balance described above. This exploration will focus on the role of
patent protection in spurring innovation and advancement, the
immediacy and magnitude of the public health crises affecting the
peoples of the world, and the idea of striking a balance by providing flexibility through exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement. Section IV will break down the main arguments put forth by the
developing nations and those put forth by the developed members
6. See World Trade Organization, WTO's Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
final e.htm (last visited on Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter TRIPS]. This link will provide
access to the full legal texts from the Uruguay Round Final Act from which the World
Trade Organization was created. The TRIPS agreement can be found under Annex
1C.
7. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5, 5(b).
5(c).
8. Id.
9. Id. It 7.
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of the WTO. Finally, section V of the comment will look at how
the events of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax scare that followed, changed the geopolitical framework of the debate, an alteration that resulted two months later in the Qatar Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Free Trade and the World Trade Organization
(WTO)

From the divisiveness and destruction of World War II
emerged the goal of creating a multilateral organization that
would serve as the locus for efforts to revive and oversee the postwar world economy. In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (the World Bank), the International Trade
Organization (ITO) was envisioned as one of three international
institutions that would restore the economic world order, while
working to avoid the tragic errors of the post-First World War
period that, in the opinion of many, served to precipitate the second world conflict. 10
The ITO ultimately fell victim to political opposition in the
United States rooted in the suspicion and distrust of the nascent
Cold War, but the fundamental objectives of the ITO continued to
garner the attention of the world's trading nations.11 With the
goal of reducing trade barriers, twenty-three nations became signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
in 1947.12 The GATT reflected many of the policy goals of the
once-proposed ITO, and successfully served as the principal body
of substantive international law governing member policies with
respect to the trade of goods until the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreements, which resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization ('WTO).

3

10. See generally ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 467 (2d ed.
1999).
11. See id.
12. For a more complete history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its role as the foundation for the World Trade Organization, see World
Trade Organization, The WTO and GATT - Are they the same? at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif elfact6_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
13. SwAN AND MURPHY, supra note 10, at 467-68.
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

The WTO built on the decades of experience and work resulting from the signing of the GATT and expanded the elements of
international trade and economics that would be addressed multilaterally. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of approximately twenty-five
legal texts composing the agreement establishing the WTO,"4 and
as such, is subject to the WTO dispute settlement system.'" The
TRIPS Agreement covers intellectual property rights in general,
and more specifically, subject matter relating to mechanisms of
protection such as patents which serve the purpose of preventing
others from making, using, or selling a new invention for a limited
period of time."
It is from within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement that
the issue of international pharmaceutical patent protection must
be explored. From the balance that TRIPS attempts to strike
between the pharmaceutical companies who seek to protect their
investments in research and development and the undeniable
need for affordable drugs in the developing world, to the incorporation of numerous exceptions as to governments' obligations
under TRIPS, the application of the multilateral agreement's provisions has been filled with contention and controversy.' The central role of TRIPS in the debate about the future of free trade was
evinced most recently in the November 2001 WTO ministerial
meeting in Doha, Qatar, where discussions on the topic resulted in
a separate ministerial declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
14. Unlike the organizational structure established under GATT, where bilateral
or multilateral side agreements were applicable only as to the parties to those
agreements, the side agreements to the WTO contained in Annexes 1-4 are applicable
as to every member of the WTO. The TRIPS Agreement is such an agreement and is
contained in Annex 1C. For more on the WTO and its respective Annexes see SwAN
AND MuRPHY, supra note 10, at 473-74.
15. World Trade Organization, PharmaceuticalPatents and the TRIPS Agreement
(July 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/trips-e/
pharma atol86_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical
Patents and the TRIPS Agreement].
16. World Trade Organization, TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatents WTO OMC
Fact Sheet (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e
tripse.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter WTO OMC Fact Sheet].
17. World Trade Organization, Governments Share Interpretationson TRIPS and
Public Health (June 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/newse/
news0le/trips-drugs_010620_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter
Interpretationson TRIPS].
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public health.
III.

18

THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE - INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION

A.

Short Term and Long Term Objectives Under
TRIPS

The WTO, in its fact sheet pertaining to pharmaceutical patents, proposes that the philosophy underlying the TRIPS Agreement is one that seeks to strike a balance between the long-term
social objective of providing incentives for future inventions and
creation, and the short-term objective of allowing people to use
existing inventions and creations. 9 The interplay of these two,
often contradictory, objectives reverberates along lines that divide
the developed and developing world, and provides the backdrop
for understanding a complex problem involving questions ranging
from social justice and morality to economic and investment
theory.2"
The WTO fact sheet asserts that this elusive balance is
sought through the application of policies that reflect three basic
conceptual and philosophical tenets. The first of these holds that
intellectual property protection encourages inventors and creators
because they can expect to earn some future benefit from their
creativity and investments. 21 The second aspect of this policy
18. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5.
19. WTO OMC Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 1. (The WTO OMC fact sheet on
TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents includes the following wording, "This fact sheet
has been prepared by the Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO
Secretariat to help public understanding. It is not an official interpretation of the
WTO agreements or member's positions."). This type of language is representative
that member nations each have their own interpretation of what protection they
should afford foreign patent holders, and of what represents a "national emergency"
or "other circumstances of extreme urgency." These differences in interpretation are
central to the debate about the extent of restrictions imposed by the TRIPS
Agreement and their effect on public health measures.
20. See Dollar & Kraay, supra note 1, at 131, for a general discussion of the
multidisciplinary nature of the debate regarding the protection of intellectual
property rights and the issue's place in the larger debate about globalization and free
trade initiatives.
21. See discussion below on comments made by the Secretary General and the
Deputy Secretary General of the WTO regarding the importance of intellectual
property rights protection. See also Thomas H. Maugh II, Vaccine for AIDS Shows
Promise, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at Al; Steve Sternberg, A Step Forwardin the
AIDS Vaccine Dance, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2002, at 8D (describing an update on the
advancement of efforts to create an HIV/AIDS vaccine in the United States at an
expense of millions of dollars and years of research).
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approach is that intellectual property protection can be engineered in such a manner as to service social goals. This approach
holds that patented inventions should be disclosed in the public
domain so that others can study the patented product during the
patent's term; in short, the goal is to have the proverbial wheel
improved but not necessarily reinvented. Lastly, the TRIPS
agreement is effective only as far as signatory nations are willing
and able to adopt and apply the provisions of the multilateral
agreement.
With this practical consideration in mind, the third component of the philosophy underlying the TRIPS Agreement is the
signatories' need for flexibility in catering to inventors so that
they realize the protections granted within particular domestic
social, political, and economic realms.2 2
B.

Innovation and the Need for Patent Protection

The TRIPS Agreement adopts a standard for patent protection that, at a minimum, mandates that the patent owner have
the right "to prevent unauthorized persons from using the patented process and [from] making, using, offering for sale, or
importing the patented product or a product obtained directly by
Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement
the patented process.""
requires that the term of protection expire no earlier than twenty
years from the date of filing the patent application.2 4
The need for this level of patent protection has been outlined
by WTO Director-General Mike Moore, who describes why pharmaceutical companies need incentives to develop new drugs.
Moore explains that the pharmaceutical industry puts the average
cost of developing a new drug at around the $500 million figure. It
is his contention that without "a patent system that rewards companies for risking millions on research, anti-AIDS drugs would not
exist."
22. WTO OMC Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 1-2. (The Fact sheet prefaces its
discussion of the three tenets by stating that this is "how the balance works."). The
importance given to each of these tenets and whether they succeed in finding the
balance is obviously questionable and the subject of much debate. It is arguable that
the debate that consumed the pre-Doha consultations signifies a failure to find
balance with the distribution as it stood. It seems like the third element is taking
center stage as developing countries more aggressively assert the need for flexibility
in implementation of intellectual property protection laws.
23. PharmaceuticalPatents and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, at 2.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Mike Moore, Yes, Drugs for the Poor - and Patents as Well, INT'L HERALD
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Moore's prediction about the dampening of innovation without patent protection is described using different language and
statistics in a paper presented to the WTO and the World Health
Organization (WHO) in April 2001, where the author writes that:
Research and innovation remain the prerequisite to
obtaining new products. Without investments to support
research, one cannot find candidates. Without applied
research and investments to develop products, test them
and prove that they are safe and effective, one cannot convert candidates into products. In this respect, intellectual
property rights play a singularly important role in promoting development and availability of new products to treat
diseases. Intellectual property rights are essential for
turning ideas into candidates, turning candidates into safe
and effective
products, and for delivering products into the
6
market.1
Decisions based on business calculations of risk and return are the
precursors to the drawn-out process of research and development
that eventually results in new and beneficial drugs. Situations
where the risks outweigh the potential economic returns result in
little or no research and development effort to address grave public health crises. This type of business decision-making is
summed up by the WTO Deputy Director-General, Miguel Rodriguez, who notes that "there is no company that will invest the
resources required for research and development without a promise of some degree of exclusivity in exploiting the results of its
efforts."27 He adds that the problem is further complicated by the
fact that even with an effective intellectual property system in
place, it is another uphill battle to provide incentives for research
and development into the diseases that afflict the poor populations who reside in developing countries, where purchasing power
is so limited.28
and http://www.wto.orgl
english/news_e/news0le/tndgihtfeb2001_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
26. Richard Wilder, Market Segmentation: Techniques, Actors and Incentives The use of Intellectual Property Rights, Presentation at the Workshop on Differential
Pricing and Finance of Essential Drugs Hosted by the World Health Organization and
World Trade Organization (Apr. 8-11, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e trips e/hosbjor-presentations-e/hosbjor-presentations-e.htm. (last visited
April 23, 2002).
27. World Trade Organization, An AppropriateBalance for Public Health (Oct. 11,
2000), available at http:I/www.wto.orgenglish/news_enewsOOe/tn-rodrig-sepOO-e.
htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
28. Id.
TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2001, available at http://www.iht.com
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The Immediacy and Magnitude of a Public Health
Crisis

Director-General Moore's presentation of the reasons why
patent protection is essential to the development of new drugs is
countered by the equally compelling (or greater) need for affordable drugs in the world's poorest countries. The Director-General
notes that malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS kill six million people
each year, with most of the deaths occurring in the developing
world.29 He describes how access to drug care is made impossible
by the fact that keeping an AIDS patient alive for one year can
cost up to $15,000 - the equivalent of twenty four times the average annual income in Zimbabwe, where one in four adults is HIVpositive."
The dire statistics presented by the Director-General of the
WTO are further accentuated by facts incorporated into Richard
Wilder's presentation at the April, 2001 Workshop on Differential
Pricing and Financing for Essential Drugs. Wilder argues that
the challenges of providing pharmaceutical products to patients in
developing and least developed countries are immense. He cites
as an example the drug regime "for treating patients afflicted with
HIV/AIDS, which can encompass the administration of seventeen
to thirty pills each day for the life of the patient." 1 The sheer
costs associated with the treatment of HIV and AIDS creates a
chasm between the developed and developing world. Accordingly,
it is in the developing world, and most acutely on the African continent, that aggressive efforts must be undertaken to slow the
spread of diseases that afflict the populations of many nations at
epidemic rates. 2
D.

Flexibility through Exceptions to the TRIPS
Agreement

As described previously, the balance sought by the WTO in
the TRIPS Agreement is underpinned by a philosophy that holds
29. Moore, supra note 25. See also Challenges for Humanity, supra note 2.
30. Id.
31. Wilder, supra note 26, at 1.
32. Challengesfor Humanity, supra note 2, at 12. Additionally, the article reports
on the status of other widespread ailments including influenza, diarrheal diseases,
tuberculosis, malaria, and measles, which together with HIV/AIDS account for ninety
percent of the deaths from infectious disease worldwide - some of which affect the
world's nations indiscriminately, while others fall on either side of the separation
between the developed and developing world.
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that member nations must be given the flexibility they need in
enacting intellectual property laws so as to make the process politically and socially viable." This flexibility, as reflected in the
mechanisms and exceptions described below, is the result of the
efforts of the developing and least developed countries to incorporate their concerns into the debate following the creation of the
WTO and about the growth of free trade initiatives. 4 From the
contention that requiring countries to strictly enforce pharmaceutical patents enables drug companies in the developed world to
charge exorbitant prices that the poor cannot afford, follows the
push for flexibility in enacting intellectual property laws.35 The
following is a description of the language in the TRIPS Agreement, which creates exceptions to the provisions requiring patent
protection.
Under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing with patentable subject matter, member governments can refuse to grant
patents for three reasons. Article 27(2) states that members "may
exclude from patentability inventions, [when] prevention within
their territory [for] commercial exploitation . . . is necessary to

protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal, or plant life, or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment[.]1"36 Similarly, a government can refuse patents
under Article 27.3 (a) and (b) for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals, and for plant
and animal inventions excluding those dealing with microorganisms. 7
The notion that the public good may, under certain circumstances, outweigh the right to have one's innovation and creation
protected is further developed in Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 8 reads as follows:
(1) Members may, in formulating or amending their laws
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
33. There is danger in clumping all developing countries together in this
discussion. While countries like India and Brazil harbor hopes of advancing their
own infant research and development capabilities, the nations of the African subcontinent and most in the western hemisphere and Caribbean have the much more
pressing need of addressing public health epidemics as their main concern in the
debate about pharmaceutical patent protection and the TRIPS Agreement's
implementation.
34. Interpretationson TRIPS, supra note 17, § 1.
35. Moore, supra note 25.
36. TRIPS, supra note 6.
37. Id.
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interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
(2) Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders or the resort to practices, which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology. 8
Shortly after its adoption, the language of Article 8 gave rise to a
practice whereby countries began to invoke TRIPS as the basis for
the argument that their domestic health crises necessitated the
amending of their laws regarding intellectual property rights (or
their immediate non-enforcement) in order to protect the public
interest.'9
In relation to Article 8, it is important to note that this section
of the TRIPS Agreement holds another major concession made to
the developing nations in its adoption. The developing countries
had argued for a form of research "piggy-backing," which would
allow for the further development of pharmaceutical products during the patent term. The theory for allowing this type of research
on patented product was that the balance, which the TRIPS
Agreement sought in principle, is better approached by allowing a
form of forced collaboration between pharmaceutical companies,
while simultaneously seeking to protect the patent through the
minimum twenty year term.40
This concession to the developing countries is adopted in Article 8(2) and is commonly referred to as the "regulatory" or "Bolar"
exception. Under this exception, some countries allow manufacturers of generic drugs to use the patented invention for research
and development as they work their way through the pharmaceutical drug-approval process, without the patent owner's permission and before the patent protection expires. The idea behind
this exception is that it speeds up the process of bringing generics
to the local market after the patent term has expired.4 This practice has been upheld by the WTO dispute resolution body in a deci38. Id.
39. For general background information see Rachel Swarns, AIDS Drug Battle
Deepens in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2001, at Al.
40. TRIPS, supra note 6. The second paragraph of article 8 has been construed
broadly to allow for the "regulatory" or "Bolar" exception.
41. WTO OMC Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 3.
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sion where a Canadian law allowing this exception
was held to be
42
in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.
Another major concession to the TRIPS signatories from the
developing world is Article 31, which encompasses what is
described as "other use without authorization of the right
holder."4 3 This provision of the TRIPS Agreement grants member
governments the right to legitimize compulsory licensing. This
form of licensing allows a non-patent holder to produce the patented product or process absent the consent of the patent's rightful owner. Article 31 tries to limit the circumstances under which
compulsory licensing can be utilized. Article 31(b) requires that
under most circumstances, "the proposed user has made efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions, and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time."" Additionally, Article
31(h) requires that after a compulsory license is issued without
the consent of the patent's holder, "the right holder shall be paid
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization."45

As

evinced by the language used in outlining the circumstances
under which "other use without the authorization of the right
holder" is permitted, the protection of patent rights is open to significant challenges even in countries agreeing to the provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement in general.
This malleable language used in the drafting of Article 31 is
especially important in the context of Article 31(b), parts of which
were described above, but which in its entirety reads as follows:
Such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use. In situations of national emer42. World Trade Organization, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products (Mar. 17, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/distabase_
wtomembersle.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002). Click on the link for Canada "as
respondent" and search for the document by date or document number, which for the
original decision is WT/DS114R.
43. TRIPS, supra note 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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gency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as possible."
The requirement that "efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time" is fraught with ambiguity and is highly problematic from the perspective of the patent right holder who, in all likelihood, cringes at the sight of the word "reasonable" appearing
twice in one sentence.
Because of the ambiguity contained in the Article, it has been
central to the debate about the enforcement of patent rights in the
developing world, where arguably the level of infections from diseases like HIV and AIDS have created a "national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency" in many signatory countries. The implications of this argument will be discussed further
following this section on exceptions to patent protection.
The issue of parallel or grey-market imports involves the
unauthorized importation of a patented product from country A
into country B, where both countries afford the patent holder protection, but the drug or product sells for less money in country A.
In an instance of parallel importation, a separate company or individual would buy the product in country A, where it sells for less,
and would then import it into country B where he could sell the
same product at a higher price. It is worth noting that the products being imported in this fashion are not counterfeit or dangerous copies, but products of the same quality.
Understandably, the developing and developed nations of the
world each took a different perspective on the issue of parallel
importation. The developing countries argue that parallel importation is essential to ensuring the lowest price possible for drugs of
comparable quality and effectiveness; the European Union, Switzerland and the United States argue that parallel importation,
and the accompanying danger of cheaper products flowing back
into the developed countries' markets, has the potential of undermining efforts aimed at establishing an effective system for "dif46. TRIPS, supra note 6.
47. For a thorough discussion on parallel trade, see Alberto Heimler, The
PharmaceuticalIndustry and Parallel Trade, Market Segmentation: Techniques,
Actors and Incentives - The Use of Intellectual Property Rights, Presentation during
the Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs Hosted by the
World Health Organization and World Trade Organization, (Apr. 8-11 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/hosbjor-presentations_e/
hosbjor-presentations-e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
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ferential pricing," whereby companies sell at lower prices in
developing countries.48
In addition to the connection drawn between parallel importation and differential pricing, the connection between parallel
importation and the TRIPS Agreement involves Article 6 and the
idea of patent exhaustion. The notion of exhaustion is that once a
patent holder sells its product, its rights over the product's use or
resale are exhausted, putting what happens to the product after
the point of sale out of its control. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with exhaustion, and states that "for the purposes of
dispute settlement under [TRIPS], subject to the provisions of
Article 3 and 4, nothing in the Agreement shall be used to address
the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights."4 9 The practical effect of this provision is that even where parallel or greymarket importation is undertaken in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement in a signatory State which allows it, the WTO is powerless to address the dispute through its internal dispute settlement procedure, unless it involves an issue of discrimination
under Article 3 or 4. °
A final note on the issue of exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement is that signatories that were designated as developing or as
being least-developed countries were granted transition periods
following the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement so that
they could enact its provisions. Article 65(2), detailing the transitional arrangements, allows developing country members to
"delay for a further period of four years the date of application...
of the provisions of [the] Agreement." 1 This gave developing
countries until January 1, 2000 to complete the transition. Under
the provisions of Article 66(1), with respect to least-developed
country members:
in view of [their] special needs and requirements . . . their
economic, financial and administrative constraints, and
their need for flexibility to create a viable technological
base . . . [are] not required to apply the provisions of [the
TRIPS] Agreement . . . for a period of ten years from the
date of application.5 2
These graduated transition periods are an additional component
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Interpretationson TRIPS, supra note 17, at 3.
TRIPS, supra note 6.
WTO OMC Fact Sheet, supra note 16, at 5.
TRIPS, supra note 6.
Id.
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of the concessions made to the developing and least-developed signatories so as to make the implementation of intellectual property
protection laws politically, economically and socially possible.
However, as will be discussed below, the transition periods would
not prove long enough.
With these concessions to the developing world in its members' efforts to obtain flexibility in the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement's provisions, it is logical to examine which
problems might result from this arrangement and to ask questions about whether the exceptions swallow the Agreement, rendering it inefficient or useless. The positions on opposite ends of
the debate about intellectual property protection and the need for
affordable drugs in the developing world shed light on these
questions.
IV.

TRIPS UNBALANCED

-

THE BATTLE LINES ARE DRAwN

Following the protest-plagued ministerial meeting of the
WTO in Seattle, the agenda for the November 2001 meeting in
Doha, Qatar began to take shape. 3 At the June 2001 TRIPS
Council's Meeting, the jockeying for control of the agenda and the
introduction of discussion topics came to a peak in relation to the
issues of pharmaceutical patent protection and access to drugs.
From this meeting emerged the basic positions of the developed
and developing world in relation to the issues of compulsory
licensing, parallel imports and other issues related to TRIPS and
access to medicines. A follow-up meeting was held in September
2001, from which two papers emerged. In essence, these papers
delineated the battle lines in the debate just a few weeks prior to
the Qatar meeting.54 These draft papers were submitted independently by two blocks55of nations. The positions advocated by each
are discussed below.

53. World Trade Organization, WTO Members to Press on Following Rich Debate
on Medicines (June 22, 2001) at http://www.wto.org/englishlnews-elpres0le/pr233_e.
htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Debate on Medicines]. This article
summarizes the Geneva TRIPS council discussion on intellectual property rights and
access to medicines held on June 20, 2001. This meeting was the beginning of a
process that was to last through the November meeting in Qatar, during which the
positions of the members on the issue would be defined.
54. World Trade Organization, Members Discuss Drafts for Ministerial
Declaration (Sept. 21, 2001) available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
news0l_e/trips drugs_010919_e.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
55. The Developing Country Group's Paper on TRIPS and Public Health dated
June 19, 2001 was submitted by the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan,
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A.

The Developing World's Position

The Developing Country Group's Paper begins by asserting
that the purpose of the discussion on TRIPS and public health at
the TRIPS' Council should be to ensure that the TRIPS Agreement does not undermine the implementation of public health policies by members.5" Additionally, the Paper states that while the
TRIPS Agreement provides room for the implementation of public
health policy measures, the flexibility afforded to members to
modify the Agreement must be extended to situations where the
provisions in TRIPS fail to address specific and pressing public
health threats. Accordingly, the developing countries argue, the
provisions of the TRIPS agreement must be read with deference to
Articles 7 and 8, which seek to protect intellectual property rights
without ignoring the need for policies that make needed drugs
available to people."7
The Developing Country Group's paper also delves into the
issue of compulsory licensing and discusses the benefits of
allowing such licensing as a tool for assuring the prevention of
abuses such as anticompetitive measures.58 The Paper makes the
argument that compulsory licensing fosters the development of
pharmaceutical industries in the developing world, and that it is
an essential mechanism for dealing with national emergencies
and other circumstances of extreme urgency as described in Article 8.11
Additionally, the developing countries hold that domestic legislation pertaining to parallel importation, and the principle of
exhaustion fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the member
countries and outside the realm of the WTO dispute settlement'
process under Article 6.60 Lastly, the Paper makes reference to
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. The European
Union's Paper to the TRIPS Council for the Special Discussion on Intellectual
Property and Access to Medicines was submitted the following day on June 20, 2001.
See World Trade Organization, Developing Country Group's PaperSubmitted to the
TRIPS Council for the Special Discussion on Intellectual Property and Access to
Medicines (June 19, 2001) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/
paperdevelopw296_e.htm; EU'S Paper Submitted to the TRIPS Council for the
Special Discussion on Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines (June 20, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/paper-euw280_e.htm. (last
visited Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Developing Country Group's Paper].
56. Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 55.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the possibility of extending the transitional period for the least
developed countries, and introduces the idea that while nominally
given flexibility through TRIPS, efforts need to be made to insure
that the developing countries are able to exercise that flexibility in
accordance with their needs."'
The developing countries back their arguments up with a listing of resolutions, recommendations, declarations and studies
calling for policies that broaden access to essential drugs at low
costs for all of the world's citizens.12 Second, the developing countries resort directly to the text of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement to substantiate their position." In particular, they
argue that Article 7 establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property cannot be sought while ignoring the
context and circumstances in which it is to be protected and
enforced. They also propound that the language in Article 8
clearly establishes that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement will prevent members from adopting measures to protect public health.'
61. See generally Debate on Medicines, supra note 53, for the proposition that
while recognizing that the TRIPS Agreement grants flexibility, it is the concern of
developing nations that the provisions granting flexibility are too narrowly
interpreted by the developed countries and that in addition, developing countries
come under undue pressure not to make full use of the flexibility that the TRIPS
Agreement affords them.
62. Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 55. The paper lists the
following: Two May 2001 resolutions from the 54th World Health Assembly - the
resolution "Scaling Up the Response to HIV/AIDS" (WHA 54.10), and the resolution
"WHO Medicines Strategy" (WHA 54.11), which calls for making drugs available at
lower prices for those in need; Resolution 2001/33 of the 57th Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights adopted in April 2001 and calling for an increase in
access to medicines... especially for those who can least afford the costs; the Report of
the Secretary General to the General Assembly of the U.N. for the Special Session on
HIV/AIDS (document A/55/779, issued on 16 Feb. 2001), calling for the expansion of
low-cost generic drug availability, and the reaffirmation of the importance of
compulsory licensing and parallel importation to the increase in access to drugs;
Statements from the XI Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Group
of Fifteen (G-15) in May 2001, where the heads of state called for noninterference of
TRIPS in efforts to implement compulsory licensing and parallel importation
legislation to ensure access to life-saving drugs at affordable prices to overcome
hazards to public health and nutrition caused by HIV/AIDS and other diseases; and
lastly, the recommendations of non-governmental organizations such as Medecins
sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), OXFAM, and Consumers International
that the TRIPS Agreement not be applied in detriment to public health policies. See
World Trade Organization, Developing Country Group's Paper Submitted to the
TRIPS Council for the Special Discussion on Intellectual Property and Access to
Medicines, I[ 7-14.
63. TRIPS, supra note 6.
64. Developing Country Group's Paper,supra note 55, 9T91-6.
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The Developed World and its Pharmaceutical
Industry Weigh-In

On September 20, 2000, the European Commission (EC) and
its member states proposed a paper reiterating the main objectives of EC development policy, including the elimination of communicable diseases within the framework of the existing goal of
reducing poverty in developing countries. On February 21, 2001,
the EC effectively adopted the paper entitled Accelerated Action
Targeted at Major Communicable Diseases Within the Context of
Poverty Reduction, as a program for accelerated action on HIV/
AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of poverty
reduction. 65
The paper then shifts its attention to the issue of intellectual
property rights and reiterates the EC's position that such rights
are central to fostering creativity and innovation. 6 The paper
argues that Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement give developing nations the flexibility and discretion they need to viably implement the Agreement.
On the issue of compulsory licensing, the EC notes that while
"Article 31 does not itself contain tailor-made solutions to any specific problem raised in the debate on access to health, it does leave
WTO members the freedom to determine the grounds for granting
compulsory licenses ...

and it allows for swift action in case[s] of

emergency or extreme urgency."6 7 The EC goes as far as agreeing
with the contention that levels of HIV/AIDS infections in certain
developing countries reach the level of a national emergency or
circumstance of extreme urgency. Lastly, the EC concedes that
there may be room for discussion pertaining to the importation of
goods manufactured under compulsory licenses in other countries.
The EC holds reservations about the applicability of this reading
of Article 31, but leaves the issue open to discussion in the paper.6

65. Id. at 5. The EU's paper refers readers to the following web address for
additional information regarding the topic, see http://www.cc.cec:8082/comm/
development/sector/social/health en.htm.
66. Id. J1 7-8.
67. Id. 11.
68. See id. The paper again refers readers to the following web address for
additional information on the EC's position: httpJ/www.cc.cec:8082/commitrade/pdf/
med-lic.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
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THE BALANCE SHIFTS - SEPTEMBER 11TH,

BIOTERRORISM AND THE QATAR DECLARATION ON
THE

TRIPS

AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, and the anthrax scare that followed, affected the debate
about pharmaceutical patent protection to an extent that is yet to
be determined, but which is clearly significant.6 9 As the U.S. government and its constituents recovered from the initial shock of
the September 11th attacks, a still unresolved crime began its
assault on the American psyche. Anthrax spores in the form of
powder made their way through post offices in numerous states to
the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., to the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) building at Rockefeller Plaza in New
York City, and to several other media outlets. Several people died
from the coetaneous and inhaled form of the disease and
thousands were treated with the antibiotic Cipro.7"
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and medical
experts urged people to remain calm and insisted that anthrax
was not easily transmitted. Regardless, people throughout the
United States and the world bought Cipro in large quantities. The
government was faced with the reality of a limited supply of the
antibiotic, and a sole pharmaceutical company holding a valid patent for the drug of the hour.71 Legislators in the U.S. and Canada
began discussions about legislation designed to circumvent patents and to create a large and quickly available supply of the

69. William Perry, Preparingfor the Next Attack, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov. 2001,
available at 2001 WL 29745970, for a broad discussion of the threats facing the
United States and its allies following the events of September 11, 2001. Of particular
note is the discussion on increased likelihood that the next attack will involve nuclear
or biological weapons.
70. See The War Against the Spore, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2001, available at
2001 WL 7320583, for a discussion of the anthrax attacks in several U.S. states, that
as of the writing of this paper remain an unresolved crime. See also David E.
Rosenbaum, Traces of Terror: The Bioterror Threat; Anthrax Scare at Bank; Lie Tests
at Army Lab, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A24, for a more recent update on the
investigation into the anthrax attacks across the country in the Fall of 2001.
71. It is worth noting that the availability of the vaccine for anthrax involves a
completely different set of issues. The U.S.'s only maker of the vaccine, Bioport, was
given clearance by the FDA to resume production of the vaccine after four years at the
end of January, 2002, following a stop precipitated by FDA violations at Bioport's
production facilities. For more see Associated Press, A Nation Challenged: The
Vaccine Maker - Troubled Company is Allowed to Resume Making Vaccine, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

314

[Vol. 33:2 & 3

72

drug.
The issue came to a head when Canada overrode the patent
held by Bayer for Cipro and ordered the generic version from a
Canadian company. 3 The Bush administration threatened similar action and Bayer finally agreed to sell the government bulk
supplies at deep discounts. Pharmaceutical giants like Merck,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Bayer, Pfizer, Eli Lilly, and Johnson &
Johnson responded to the endangerment of their patents with
forceful lobbying and the promise to come to the nation's aid by
helping the government build its stockpile of drugs, which may
become necessary in the eventuality of a large-scale bio-terrorist
4
attack.1
Against this backdrop the WTO ministerial meeting in Doha,
Qatar was convened with the goals of discussing pressing issues
left unresolved and of agreement on opening a new round of trade
talks. At the heart of the unresolved issues was the debate on the
TRIPS Agreement and public health. The recent actions undertaken by Canada, and threatened by the U.S., in relation to the
overturning of patents, angered developing countries which had
long been arguing for greater flexibility in addressing their own
public health threats, which they argue amount to "national emergencies" or "other circumstances of extreme urgency" as per the
language of the TRIPS Agreement's own provisions. 5
72. Laurie Garrett, The Nightmare of Bioterrorism, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb.
2001, for a discussion of the subject pre-dating the attacks on the United States.
73. Olson, supra note 4.
74. Leslie Wayne & Melody Peterson, A Muscular Lobby Tries to Shape Nation's
Bioterror Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, _ 3, at 1.
75. Bipul Chatterjee, India: Get TRIPS out of the WTO, THE HINDu, Nov. 8, 2001,
available at WL 29988351. This article coming out of India is significant because
India has played a large role in articulating the position of the developing countries.
The author of the article notes that the U.S. was at the time considering granting
compulsory licenses to manufacturers who could produce Cipro so as to add to what
Bayer, the patent holder, could produce. The article describes a U.S. double standard
when it comes to intellectual property right protection; an issue which, according to
the article, the U.S. fought to keep off the negotiating table during the Seattle
meeting in 1999. The article also raises an interesting theory relating to the inclusion
of TRIPS in the WTO. It is the article's contention that the TRIPS Agreement
impedes the making of drugs available at low prices to poor countries and argues that
TRIPS belongs under the auspice of the World Intellectual Property Organization and
not the WTO. In support of this position, the author of the article asserts that TRIPS
does not belong in the WTO because of the large discrepancies in experience with
intellectual property law and policy among WTO members, the lack of consensus on
the proper role and elements of intellectual property law, the politicized nature of
intellectual property disputes, and the WTO's dispute resolution system's potential
infringement of national sovereignty in cases involving disputes over implementation
of intellectual property laws. As will be described, the role of TRIPS was at the center
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One Brazilian trade negotiator admitted to the New York
Times that the Canadian and American actions relating to Bayer
and Cipro had provoked a lot of talk about the perceived double
standard, and created pressure to strike a compromise at the biannual ministerial meeting in Qatar. 6 What follows is the text of
the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
adopted on November 14, 2001, with discussion pertaining to key
parts:
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) to be part of the wider national and international action to address these problems.
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is
important for the development of new medicines. We
also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices."
The first three points of the declaration provide an almost carbon
copy of the opening points of the drafts completed by the developing country group and the European Union." In particular, the
opening statement concedes the gravity of the public health crises
affecting the world's poor. The second point, in direct rejection of
a position coming out of India calling for the rejection of the
TRIPS Agreement as part of the WTO, affirms the place of the
TRIPS Agreement at the center of any effort to resolve worldwide
public health problems. 9 The third point is a mixed point, which
reflects the developing world's concern with prohibitive pricing
and the developed world's position that without intellectual property right protection, there will be a chilling effect on research and
development.8 °
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that
of the debate at Doha and what emerged was a reaffirmation of the TRIPS
Agreement, but also a victory for the developing world.
76. Olson, supra note 4.
77. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5.
78. Deueloping Country Group's Paper, supra note 55.
79. Chatterjee, supra note 75.
80. Interpretationson TRIPS, supra note 17.
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the Agreement can be and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we
reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full,
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
flexibility for this purpose.
5. Accordingly and in light of paragraph 4 above, while
maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement,
we recognize that these flexibilities include:
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular,
in its objectives and principles.
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licenses are granted.
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of
extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstance
of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment
provisions of Article 3 and 4.1

The heart of the victory for the developing and least-developed
countries of the world lies in points 4 and 5. Here, the developing
world's position on the issues of compulsory licensing, exhaustion,
interpretation and designation of national emergencies and other
circumstances of extreme urgency triumphs over the concerns of
the developed nation block.
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct
the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to
81. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5.
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this problem and to report to the General Council before
the end of 2002.
7. We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country members to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to
least-developed country members pursuant to Article
66.2. We also agree that the least developed country
members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of
Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these sections until 1 January 2016,
without prejudice to the right of least-developed country
members to seek other extensions of the transition periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to take
necessary action to give effect to2 this pursuant to Article
66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.1

Lastly, points 6 and 7 address the needs and concerns of the
world's least developed nations." From devising ways of helping
the LDCs to better exploit the opportunity of compulsory licensing
to the extension of the transition period for an additional decade,
the Doha Declaration recognizes that these nations, often the
same ones with the gravest health crises, are the least able to set
up a viable intellectual property right protection system or the
least in need of doing so at this time.
In summary, the Doha Declaration represents a clear victory
for the developing and least-developed member countries. The
concessions given to this block of countries is concrete: extensions
on the transition period for least developed countries for another
decade; the reaffirmation of the practice of granting compulsory
licensing; recognition of the gravity of the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
and malaria epidemics in the developing world; greater latitude
for interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in
light of the interest of protecting public health and the need to
make medicines accessible to all; the power to unilaterally determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency; the affirmation that the above-listed
epidemics represent such situations; and the opening for further
instances of parallel importation under the theory of exhaustion
for intellectual property rights.
The Declaration reflects almost entirely the goals of the devel82. Id.
83. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 5.
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oping and least-developed countries as set out in their paper to the
TRIPS Council." Alternately, the developed countries walk away
with a reaffirmation of the importance of intellectual property
right protection for innovation and creativity and with a commitment to encourage their industries to transfer technology to the
developing and least-developed countries of the world. WTO
Director-General Mike Moore summarizes the results of this declaration and the other efforts of 2001 in his informal end-of-theyear report on the activities of the World Trade Organization.
Moore states that:
the [WTO has] placed development issues and the interests
of our poorer members at the heart of our work ... while
the Doha Development Agenda was launched out of mutual
self-interest, for many resource-constrained member countries it was also a brave act of faith, trust, and hope. I
believe
members have already begun to deliver on this
faith.85
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the issue of pharmaceutical patent protection
has been elevated to the heights of the global discussion on the
future of the free trade initiative. The astronomical costs of
research and development involved in bringing new and effective
medicines to market and the epidemic levels of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other diseases are at the heart of this debate.
The line of interests are unfortunately clear, with the developed
countries seeking to protect their valuable pharmaceutical industries, and the developing countries struggling to meet the
demands of their sick citizenry for more affordable medications. If
the question were one of taking from the rich to give to the poor, a
simple answer based on morality and social justice would suffice.
Unfortunately, the reality is much more complex and potentially
tragic.
The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States
and the anthrax-based bio-terrorism witnessed in the weeks following, made one thing clear - governments will act to respond to
actual and potential national emergencies even to the point of
ignoring the much valued rights of intellectual property holders.
84. Developing Country Group's Paper, supra note 55.
85. World Trade Organization, Moore Outlines Successes of 2001, Roadmap for
2002 (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http'//www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0le/
pr265_e.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
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It is an extreme form of eminent domain that crosses borders and
which has given the developing world the leverage it needed to
push its agenda at the Qatar ministerial meeting of the WTO.
What results is a declaration affirming the contentions of the
developing and least-developed countries of the world that the
epidemics which cripple their societies are national emergencies
on par with the tragedy that befell the United States in September of 2001.
What remains to be seen is whether this affirmation and the
actions yet to be taken by the countries in reaction to these
epidemics will chill the research and development efforts of the
developed world's pharmaceutical companies - not for the drugs
which will be purchased on the developed world's streets, but for
those drugs most needed in the developing world alone. If that
proves to be the unintentional result, then a lager tragedy may be
waiting to afflict the world's poor.8"
ARNOLDO LACAYO*

86. For a discussion of the initial work undertaken by the TRIPS Council following
the ministerial meeting in Qatar, see World Trade Organization, Members Start Work
on Doha Agenda Items, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news02_e/
tripsreg 020307_e.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002). The article discusses how the
TRIPS Council has started discussions on proposals for dealing with compulsory
licensing when member States lack domestic production capacity. The discussions
will continue in June of 2002.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2003, University of Miami School of Law. I
would like to express my immense gratitude to my wife, Monika, for her unconditional
support and encouragement. I also wish to thank the editors and staff of the
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review for their assistance and support.
Finally, I would like to thank Professor Alan Swan for his guidance and advice.
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VII.

APPENDIX

MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
DOHA, 9 - 14 NOVEMBER 2001
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND PUBLIC HEALTH
ADOPTED ON 14 NOVEMBER 2001
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to
be part of the wider national and international action to
address these problems.
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines. We also recognize
the concerns about its effects on prices.
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public
health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the
full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
flexibility for this purpose.
5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities include:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement
shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives
and principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences
and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licences are granted.

2002] PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION

321

(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that
are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own
regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to
the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3
and 4.
6.

We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to
report to the General Council before the end of 2002.

7.

We reaffirm the commitment of developed-country Members
to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to
promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed
country Members pursuant to Article 66.2. We also agree that
the least-developed country Members will not be obliged, with
respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply
Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to
enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the right of least-developed
country Members to seek other extensions of the transition
periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to take the necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article 66.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement."

87. The Qatar Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/minOle.htm (Last visited
April 23, 2002).

